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The design and capabilities of current naval ships may not meet the demands of 
naval operations such as anti-piracy, search and rescue, maritime interdiction, 
and force protection. Smaller vessels, especially Offshore Patrol Vessels, are 
better suited for these types of missions due to their affordability, speed, and 
flexibility. However, deciding on the requirements for a flexible, yet mission-
effective, naval vessel requires the simultaneous consideration of technical 
inputs and operational needs. 
The model-based ship design approach ensures that the mission 
requirements are linked to the capability analysis. In this way, Navy needs are 
better translated into ship requirements, and the decision makers get what they 
really need to acquire at the end of the process. The first step of this approach is 
assessing the operational effectiveness of the ships. This is done utilizing the 
combat modeling platform Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA)—and the 
power of Design of Experiments—to simulate how various potential capabilities, 
tactics, and rules of engagement affect mission outcomes. 
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Surface combatants are one of the most valuable assets of a country. They 
provide security on the sea and protect a nation’s interests across the globe. For 
these reasons, surface combatants need to be not only capable, but also flexible 
and ready to fight any threat in this rapidly changing world.  
Modern maritime menaces are threatening the shipping lanes and 
merchant vessels as well as the warships. Operations such as naval escort, anti-
piracy, and maritime interdiction have begun to take the place of conventional 
naval warfare. However, existing ships were not specifically built for these 
modern tasks, and they are extremely expensive to risk in such missions. 
Moreover, they are not flexible enough to deal with small targets. Therefore, most 
navies have started building smaller, more flexible ships to cope with evolving 
maritime threats. 
Assembling a modern, capable, and flexible fleet is challenging. The 
acquisition of new naval ships requires thorough analysis of the potential vessel’s 
capability, cost, and operational effectiveness. NPS is a participant in an Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) initiated project that focuses on the decisions involved in 
the early stages of the shipbuilding process. The NPS Operations Research and 
Systems Engineering departments are working together to form a decision-
making tool, called the NPS Dashboard, that demonstrates the trade-space 
among capability, cost, and operational effectiveness of the naval ships. The 
purpose of this thesis is to help NPS integrate the operational effectiveness of an 
Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) within an anti-surface warfare (ASUW) 
environment using the NPS Dashboard. 
Analyzing the operational effectiveness of a ship requires a scenario to 
build a combat model and a modeling platform to run multiple simulations. The 
scenario studied in this research is based on an incident that occurred 2002. In 
the scenario, the terrorists are planning to perform a suicide attack on a high 
 xvi 
value unit (HVU) in the Strait of Gibraltar. The mission of the OPV is to escort the 
HVU while crossing the strait. If the HVU can pass through the strait, then it is 
assumed to be a mission success; otherwise, if it gets hit, the mission is 
assumed to be a failure. This scenario is instantiated in an agent-based combat 
modeling platform called Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA). MANA 
provides powerful tools for realistically representing the world in a simulation 
environment. A screenshot of the combat model used for this research is shown 
below. 
 
There are six types of vessels in the scenario: HVU (pink), OPV (blue), helicopter 
(blue), hostile boats (red), known vessels (green), unknown vessels (yellow). 
 
A Design of Experiments (DoE) approach is used for varying controllable 
and uncontrollable factors that are affecting the outcome of the mission. 
Controllable factors include the capability, tactics, and rules of engagement 
(ROE) that are related to the decisions about friendly assets. Uncontrollable 
factors are related to hostile boats, known vessels, and unknown vessels. The 
data analysis is done using regression tools and partition trees. The results of the 
analysis show that both capability choices and tactical decisions have substantial 
 xvii 
effects on the result of a naval mission. Several of the key drivers of mission 
success in this scenario are shown below. 
 
Factors Capability Tactics ROE 
Main Gun Presence x x x 
Leading Ship Choice  x  
Range to Start Counter Measures x x x 
Auxiliary Gun Hit Probability x x  
Helicopter Presence x x x 
OPV Maximum Speed x   
Key decision factors that affect mission success. 
 
Most decisions about a naval ship’s capabilities are made prior to the 
design of the ship. For better decisions, the decision maker needs to know the 
trade-offs between certain options. The analysis for the operational effectiveness 
of the ships is therefore crucial. The analyst helps the decision maker choose the 
best available ship design among the alternatives. Furthermore, the tactical 
decisions of the naval officers are also paramount for accomplishing a mission. 
This thesis shows how both the capability and operational decisions can be 
analyzed in the early stages of the ship design. Even the concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for various tasks can be planned along with the ship design process.  
In the past, the experience of the sailors was the main driver of the tactical 
decisions. Today, it is the technology and the science that shape tactical decision 
making more intensely. Naval officers should know the characteristics of their 
ships, and they should rely not only their experience but also on analytical tools 
to form their decisions. Choosing the right course of action may reduce the 
emphasis on capability as the primary factor in decision making. This change has 
the potential to reduce the acquisition cost of a naval ship while improving the 
navy’s prospects for achieving mission success. 
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“He who rules the seas, rules the world” 
– Admiral Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the past two decades, there has been a significant shift in naval 
missions toward operations other than war. Counter-piracy, search and rescue, 
maritime interdiction, maritime patrol, and naval escort operations are the main 
focus of most fleets today; however, the vessels that are currently being used in 
such operations were mainly built for other purposes. For instance, in August 
2009, the North Atlantic Council approved “Operation Ocean Shield” to fight 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Among six surface ships that were assigned in the 
January-June 2012 rotation of this NATO mission, one was a destroyer and three 
were frigates (“NATO - Counter-piracy operations,” n.d.). Although those 
warships can be used in such missions, how reasonable it is to risk a destroyer 
or a frigate to fight with terrorist boats or pirates?  
 
Figure 1.  NATO warships in SNMG2 operation (image from Allied Maritime 
Command Naples – NATO,  http://www.manp.nato.int) 
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Many surface vessels that perform these modern tasks, as in the NATO Task 
Force example, are sophisticated warships capable of anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW), anti-air warfare (AAW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Although 
these sophisticated multi-mission capable fleets are able to achieve good results 
in expeditionary warfare against a strong enemy (Murphy, 2007), the capabilities 
of those ships will probably be used in less than 1% of their total life time. It 
seems a sound reason to build capable ships in case of a conventional war, and 
one can claim that capable ships are built to be used in that small period of their 
life time; nevertheless, navies should optimize their efforts and resources in 
some way to find a better mix of vessel types and a better mix of systems that 
constitute the vessels. 
While frigates and destroyers seem to be the best available options that can 
perform offshore operations, they are expensive to build and operate. On the 
other hand, smaller combatants are much cheaper and better suited for modern 
naval operations due to their flexibility. Therefore, many nations have begun 
reshaping their fleets to meet emerging operational demands: (1) they have 
started building smaller, yet sophisticated multi-mission capable combatants 
such as Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) that 
can be operated in a variety of maritime roles; (2) they have initiated the 
development of new tactics and counter measures to better deal with the new 
threats. The ship design and the acquisition processes, however, remains almost 
the same. 
 Despite technological advances in the last few decades, the ship design 
and the acquisition processes have not yet been able to keep pace with the rapid 
changes in use of technology (Ryan & Jons, 1992). Cost effectiveness and 
operational effectiveness are important, and it is extremely hard to achieve both 
using a traditional ship design process. Acceptable levels of effectiveness for 
both measures are more likely to be achieved with the use of technology and 
virtual environments. Moreover, utilizing the simulations and analytical models to 
build decision making tools will ensure collaboration between warfighters and 
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engineers in the early stages of the process. Therefore, exploiting technology is 
paramount for accomplishing a navy’s objectives and increasing the 
effectiveness for both cost and operations (Mizine, Wintersteen, & Wynn, 2012). 
B. BACKGROUND 
In December 2010, Orizzonte Sistemi Navali (OSN), an Italian contractor 
and whole warship design authority, and the Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
initiated a project called “the Application System for Naval Evaluation and Testing 
(ASNET), Partnership for Research on Naval Technology and Operations 
(PRONTO), Naval International Cooperative Opportunities in Science & 
Technology Program (NICOP).” The main purpose of this project is to analyze 
the operational effectiveness of ships using simulation and analytical models, to 
create a ship synthesis model, and most importantly, to develop decision making 
tools for ship designs using a model-based ship design approach. These tools 
will ensure that decision makers gain useful insight by exploring the trade space 
between factors affecting ship design and make informed decisions (Perra, 
Guagnano, & Bonvicini, 2012). 
The model-based ship design approach used in this project is 
fundamentally different from the way surface combatants have been built in the 
past. Previously, the focus has been on engineering design criteria; mission 
types and operational environments have not been considered until after the ship 
design is essentially complete. Nevertheless, the model-based approach ensures 
that the mission requirements are linked to the capability analysis during the ship 
production process. Using this method, which is essentially the application of 
Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) to decision making, helps ensure 
that the Navy’s needs are better translated into ship requirements, and the 
decision makers get what they really need to get at the end of the process 
(Robinson, Tramoundanis, Harvey, Jones, & Wilson, 2010). 
The chosen subject of the ASNET PRONTO NICOP project is OPVs; 
therefore, the scenarios, the cost data, and capability analyses are based on 
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OPV characteristics. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Georgia Institute of 
Technology, University of Genoa, and some other institutions are participating in 
this effort. The role of NPS is important in the project. The Operations Research 
(OR) and Systems Engineering (SE) departments are collaborating to create a 
dashboard that displays cost, capability, and operational trade-offs (Figure 2). 
The operational experience of the students and the faculty members is leveraged 
especially in building scenarios and simulation models. The insights gained from 
this work are frequently shared with ONR, OSN, and other participants during the 
workshops and the meetings. 
 




As shown in Figure 3, three main categories of data are fed into forming 
the ship synthesis dashboard:  
 Operational Effectiveness 
 Capability 
 Cost 
The operational effectiveness data and the cost estimation data are mostly 
provided by the OR students, whereas the capability data are provided by 
students in the SE curriculum.  
 
Figure 3.  A sample list of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) to include in the dashboard. 
Until now, several OR students built ASUW, Search and Rescue, and 
Maritime Interdiction Operation scenarios to evaluate key performance factors for 
ship designs. In their theses, their primary goal was to establish 
interchangeability with the models OSN created, which were simple and 
unrealistic. Moreover, those theses made limited comments on how tactics affect 
the results. Therefore, more realistic and advanced scenarios need to be created 
to be able to develop a truly useful dashboard. The factors that affect the ship 
design needs to be reconsidered as well.  
 
 6 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research detailed in this thesis focuses on the following questions 
related to the improvement of the ship design process: 
 Based on a realistic and an advanced ASUW scenario, which ship design 
factors are key drivers of OPV performance in ASUW?  
 What are the strengths and limitations of utilizing Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata – Vector (MANA-V), an agent-based modeling platform 
developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency (DTA), to 
construct advanced and realistic scenarios for evaluating effectiveness of 
naval ships? 
 How do different ship capabilities, tactics, and Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) affect the mission success?  
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
A recent thesis by Jason McKeown analyzed the operational effectiveness 
of an OPV in an ASUW environment (McKeown, 2012). His model was based on 
a swarm attack scenario, and his main concern was to establish 
interchangeability with OSN model as mentioned above. In his scenario, the 
hostile boats were trying to reach a goal line, and they were not able to attack the 
OPV. 
In light of the increase in maritime terrorism, it is also reasonable to expect 
an individual boat attack on a friendly ship while it is passing through a strait, 
refueling in a port, or patrolling the area. The main focus of this thesis is, 
therefore, assessing the mission effectiveness of a surface combat vessel in a 
realistic ASUW environment. An advanced asymmetric warfare scenario that was 
not previously implemented by OSN or NPS students is built and analyzed as 
part of this thesis. The factors tested are more realistic, and several tactics, such 
as changing the course of the ship after facing an attack, are analyzed to better 
understand how they change the response surface. Additionally, hostile boats 
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are smart in this scenario. For instance, they are able to commit a kamikaze 
attack on the friendly ships. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is the literature review that touches on the tools used in this 
thesis, the naval warfare areas, the OPVs, and MBSE. Brief descriptions based 
on the published references prepare the reader for the following chapters. 
Chapter III contains the development of the combat model and a thorough 
description of the operational scenario used in this thesis. The types of ships 
used in the combat model are explained in this chapter as well.  
Chapter IV covers the exploration of the combat model. It starts with the 
description of the experimental design used for the simulations and continues 
with the explanations of the controllable and the uncontrollable factors. Following 
this discussion, the model output is analyzed using several types of data analysis 
approaches, including regression and partition tree analysis. Significant factors 
are discussed along with the operational insights. Other implementations of the 
scenario are explained as well. 
Chapter V concludes the thesis. It gives a summary of the study and 
provides recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
F. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
The results of this study are being used to augment the ship synthesis 
model built by the Systems Engineering department, and ultimately provide 
ASNET PRONTO NICOP project participants with a decision making tool for 
naval ship design. This study is also likely to help decision makers obtain a better 
understanding of the factors effecting ASUW for surface combatants. Since the 
factors examined by this thesis are related—but not limited—to OPVs, the 
insights obtained from this study can potentially be used for other ship types, 
including frigates, fast patrol boats, or coast guard boats. Additionally, this study 
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demonstrates how tactics may affect mission success and how naval officers 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE AND MARITIME TERRORISM 
There are three primary categories of naval warfare: surface, air and 
submarine (Cole, 2007). Among those three warfare areas, surface warfare is 
perhaps the most dominant one, mainly because other areas of warfare usually 
take place in actual war conditions. The Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms describes surface warfare as “That portion of 
maritime warfare in which operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize 
enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels” (DoD Dictionary, 2006). The  
term anti-surface warfare (ASUW) is generally used in a similar meaning, and 
can be defined as operations that are performed against surface vessels utilizing 
radar, guns, or any other means (Cole, 2007).  
The reason why ASUW is the most common type of warfare lies behind 
this fact that ASUW operations not only include fighting with enemy state surface 
vessels, but also include fighting with asymmetric threats such as small suicide 
vessels or pirate boats. Naval vessels can face maritime threats at any time, 
since the terrorists and pirates can easily purchase and possess boats and 
attack a merchant vessel or a warship; therefore, those boats cause a threat, and 
they must be neutralized or destroyed whenever necessary. 
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Figure 4.  A helicopter firing warning shots in front of the pirate boat (image from 
Allied Command Operations – Nato, http://www.aco.nato.int) 
Even though the term “maritime terrorism” has been in the literature for 
more than a few decades, it was not really spelled out loudly until a series of 
incidents started in 2000. In January 2000, terrorists tried to attack USS The 
Sullivans (DDG-68) in Yemen. They failed because the terrorist boat sank right 
before the attack. Following this event, the terrorists attacked the USS Cole 
(DDG-67) with a suicide boat, killing 17 of the crew members, in October 2000. 
Almost two years after these incidents, in October 2002, a boat with explosives 
hit the French oil tanker Limburg which was close to Yemen coastal waters (Luft 
& Korin, 2004). These are just a few examples of how, with just a small boat, 
terrorists can cause damage to multi-million/billion dollar ships and—more 
importantly—kill tens of innocent people. There have also been many other 
terrorist activities which were prevented in their planning phases. In June 2002, 
for instance, Moroccan officials arrested a group of terrorists suspected of 
planning an attack on U.S. and British merchant vessels when passing through 
the Strait of Gibraltar (Maggio, 2008). These incidents show that maritime 
terrorism is a problem that must be prevented by any means, and the surface 
combatants must be ready to fight the terrorists at sea. 
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Figure 5.  USS Cole after the attack in October 2000 (image from New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com) 
B. AGENT-BASED MODELING AND MANA 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of agent-based 
modeling and simulation. The agent-based modeling approach provides 
exceptional tools for modelers to represent the real world within a computer 
program. The agent-based models consist of autonomous entities called agents, 
and the set of rules which determine the interactions between agents and the 
environment surrounding them (Bonabeau, 2002). Although there is not a precise 
definition of an “agent” (Macal & North, 2009) or “agent-based simulation,” in the 
agent-based modeling concept, the agents can be defined as the representation 
of the real world objects in an artificial environment (Cioppa, Lucas, & Sanchez, 
2004). The agents can have behaviors, which makes the agent-based modeling 
technique unique. These autonomous entities are aware of the events that they 
can detect by organic/inorganic sensors, and they respond to the environment 
with actions defined by algorithms. 
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There are many tools that can be used for agent-based modeling. These 
include general purpose programs such as Microsoft Excel VBA, C++, JAVA; 
computation and statistics programs such as MATLAB, Mathematica, R; and 
dedicated agent-based modeling platforms such as NetLogo, Repast, AnyLogic, 
MANA (Macal & North, 2009). Each of these software packages has some 
superiority in various real word applications, i.e., business applications, biological 
applications, and medical applications; nonetheless, when it comes to military 
applications, not all of them are capable of modeling the non-linear and complex 
nature of the military conflicts (Lauren & Stephen, 2002).  
 
Figure 6.  NetLogo is a widely used agent-based modeling platform (image from 
Science Education Resource Center, http://serc.carleton.edu) 
Military conflicts usually exhibit complexity in the interaction between the 
agents with other agents and the environment. Additionally, agent positions in 
space change rapidly throughout time, and the population that the agents 
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represent is usually heterogeneous (Bonabeau, 2002). All these attributes show 
that agent-based modeling is a proper tool to represent military operations, and 
choosing the right agent-based combat modeling platform will help military 
analysts to better represent the military tasks in a computer program. There are 
several agent-based modeling programs that can be practically used for 
modeling operational scenarios, including MANA, Pythagoras, and JANUS 
(Cioppa et al., 2004). Among these programs, MANA stands out as the most 
user friendly platform, and it is has been widely used by NPS faculty and 
students for almost 10 years. Military applications of agent-based modeling and 
simulation done using MANA include maritime protection of critical infrastructure 
assets (Lucas, Sanchez, Martinez, Sickinger, & Roginski, 2007), counter-piracy 
operations (Tsilis, 2011), UAV operations (Raffetto, 2004), and a comparison of 
warships against threats in confined waters (Ozdemir, 2009).  
 
Figure 7.  Screenshot of agent-based combat modeling platform MANA. 
Designed by the Operational Analysis personnel of the New Zealand’s 
DTA, MANA is an agent-based distillation model that has been available for more 
than ten years now (Lauren & Stephen, 2002). The key attributes of MANA which 
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make it a useful tool for military applications are the situational awareness of the 
agents, advanced communication capabilities within squads and with other 
agents, the interaction of entities with friends and foes, and the user friendly 
design of the program. 
 There are four main sets of parameters that form agent behaviors in 
MANA (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007): 
 Personality weightings determine the willingness of agents to 
perform a particular action. 
 Movement constraints modify the basic personality weightings of 
the agents. 
 Intrinsic capabilities determine the physical characteristics of the 
agents such as sensors, weapons, or fuel level. 
 Movement characteristic adjustments ensure that agent actions 
change in different terrain conditions and different situations. 
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Figure 8.  MANA-Screenshot of the “Squad Properties.” 
Just recently, DTA released the new version of MANA, namely MANA-V. 
“V” stands for both vector and five. In this version, the programmers replaced the 
cell-based movement of previous versions with vector-based movement, which 
allows building larger battlefield regions with panning and zooming options, and 
allows defining the distances and the attributes such as speed and range in real-
world units, such as nautical miles (knots) or meters, rather than pixels 
(McIntosh, 2009). In this thesis, MANA-V version 5.01.04 is used for modeling 
and simulation. 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
In the real world, experiments are usually built varying less than a handful 
of factors or variables. Utilizing the power of computers, on the other hand, it is 
possible to build simulations with more variables (Kleijnen, Sanchez, Lucas, & 
Cioppa, 2005). However, increasing the number of variables often causes high 
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runtimes despite the modern computers. Even with the technological advances 
and supercomputers, it may take months to run a simulation experiment with a 
large number of factors using a brute force approach. Utilizing design of 
experiments (DOE), coupled with the powerful computers, solves this problem. 
DOE makes it possible to build simulations with a relatively high number of 
parameters, and it gives an acceptable screening property of the response 
surface, which leads to gaining better insights from the experiment. 
The experimental design approach allows the analyst to provide more 
information to decision makers in a relatively small amount of time and helps 
them better understand the factors affecting the results (Kleijnen et al., 2005). 
Instead of changing factors one at a time or choosing design points with trial-
error, DOE establishes smart ways of designing an experiment, which will yield 
important insights both to the analyst and the decision makers (Sanchez, 2007). 
In addition to exploring more factors, DOE also helps the analyst spend less time 
on the simulation runs and more time on the analysis. 
There are several DOE techniques in the literature. The ones specifically 
useful in simulation design include factorial designs, fractional factorial designs, 
central composite designs, and Latin hypercube (LH) designs. Each of these 
techniques has some advantages and disadvantages depending on the number 
of factors, screening capabilities, and response surface complexity (Figure 9). 
For instance, with only a few factors, coarse grids might be useful. On the other 
hand, if the number of the factors is very large, LH designs are more efficient 
than the other designs, since they provide well screening of the response surface 




Figure 9.  Recommended designs according to the number of factors and system 
complexity assumptions (Adapted from Kleijnen et al., 2005) 
A nearly orthogonal, nearly balanced (NOB) mixed design approach is 
used to build the experiment in this thesis (Vieira, Sanchez, Kienitz, & Belderrain, 
2011). The main advantage of this technique is that it accommodates not only 
continuous factors, but also discrete and categorical factors in the design. 
D. OFFSHORE PATROL VESSEL (OPV) 
Since the industrial revolution, surface combatants have evolved rapidly. 
Naval shipyards are now able to build multi-purpose warships such as cruisers, 
destroyers, and frigates, which are the most powerful naval assets of a country. 
These ships can operate anywhere globally with less dependence on coastal 
facilities or resources. However, they are not the only fighting ships that a navy 
has. There is a variety of fighting ships, ranging from small patrol boats to 
cruisers, each of which has advantages in different situations. For instance, small 
patrol boats have a small draft, which allows them to navigate through shallow 
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waters close to the shore. On the other hand, larger ships are able to perform 
multiple tasks simultaneously. They can deal with aircraft, surface ships, 
missiles, and submarines at the same time, and they can perform counter-
measures against a variety of enemy forces. 
OPVs are relatively small combatants when compared to frigates and 
destroyers. They are more like corvettes, with less fighting capability. Their main 
purpose is maintaining maritime security inshore and offshore, and they can be 
deployed globally (Kimber & Booth, 2010). Many countries do not really need 
sophisticated naval combatants, and some countries cannot afford capable ships 
(Annati, 2009). Being cheaper yet flexible, OPVs are great options for those 
countries throughout the world.  
Nations build OPVs mainly to use in peacetime operations, and the 
primary functions of the OPVs are ASUW and AAW; however, they can also be 
used in ASW and other warfare areas, if built with such capability (Eames, 1985). 
Escort operations, anti-piracy operations, and humanitarian efforts are some of 
areas where OPVs are used. 
E. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (MBSE) 
Technological advances led humans to build complex systems over the 
years. While the systems are becoming more and more complex, it is becoming 
extremely hard for engineers and decision makers to deal with development of 
these diverse systems. Surface combatants are examples of such complex 
systems. They consist of various subsystems such as weapons and sensors. 
Moreover, the stakeholders or shareholders that work on the ship building 
process come from a wide range of industries (Calvano, Jons, & Keane, 2000). 
These make the shipbuilding process extremely complicated, especially if the 
warship is the first one of its class.  
Systems engineering tries to find a way to deal with the complex systems. 
According to Kossiakoff et al. (2011), the function of systems engineering is 
“guiding the engineering of the complex systems.” Furthermore, it is argued that 
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the systems engineering effort is centered on the systems as whole, not on the 
separate parts (Kossiakoff, Sweet, Seymour, & Biemer, 2011). 
Model-based systems engineering (MBSE) is a new approach to systems 
engineering, and it is seen as the future of the systems engineering by 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Systems Engineering 
Vision 2020 describes MBSE as “the formalized application of modeling to 
support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation 
activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout 
development and later life cycle phases” (Crisp, 2007). This approach is mainly 
useful for highly complex systems such as warships and maintains the link 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Operations to fight terrorist boats or pirate ships have become a crucial 
aspect of naval operations since terrorists have started being a threat to military 
and civilian ships in the maritime domain. In the last 15 years, there has been a 
significant increase in the number of incidents in which terrorists attacked a 
warship or a merchant vessel and killed tens of sailors. Additionally, there were 
some incidents in which the terrorists were not able to carry out their outrageous 
plans. For instance, in June 2002 a group of terrorists, who were planning an 
attack on two merchant vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar, were caught by 
Moroccan officials (Maggio, 2008). 
 
Figure 10.  There are various types of ships passing the Strait of Gibraltar at any 
moment of a day (from http://www.marinetraffic.com) 
The fact that the officials arrested those terrorists does not mean that 
similar plans will not be put into practice by other groups. If a terrorist group fills a 
boat with explosives and approaches a ship in Strait of Gibraltar, it will be really 
difficult to identify that boat as a terrorist boat since there is large number of 
vessels in the strait at any moment (Figure 10). Therefore, naval escort ships 
 22 
need to be ready to protect both themselves and the merchant vessels against 
asymmetric threats. Most current naval vessels, however, are not particularly 
built to fight terrorist boats, and they are expensive to risk in such missions. As a 
consequence, many countries started building smaller yet flexible surface 
combatants, such as OPVs, to meet the demands of their navies. Nevertheless, 
finding the best mix of capabilities such as weapons and maximum speed is a 
problem that needs to be considered in the very beginning of the shipbuilding 
process (Mizine et al., 2012). A proper way to overcome this problem is building 
combat models and testing the operational effectiveness of the surface 
combatants in scenario-based simulation environments. 
B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
In this thesis, the agent-based modeling platform MANA is used to model 
a naval escort mission scenario in an anti-surface warfare environment. The 
scenario is based on the Morocco incident that occurred in 2002. There are six 
types of agents in the scenario: the high value unit (HVU) being escorted, the 
OPV, the OPV’s helicopter, terrorist boats, known vessels, and unknown vessels.  
A screenshot from MANA appears in Figure 11; note that the sizes of the agents 
are not to scale, but are magnified for easier visualization by the user. The 
allegiance of the HVU, OPV, and the helicopter is “friend,” the allegiance of the 




Figure 11.  Screenshot of MANA. There are six types of agents in the ASUW 
scenario: HVU (pink), OPV (blue), helicopter (blue), terrorist boats (red), 
known vessels (green), unknown vessels (yellow). 
1. Friendly Assets 
The mission of the friendly assets is to cross the Strait of Gibraltar without 
allowing any damage to be caused to the HVU by hostile vessels. The OPV is 
tasked to protect the HVU from attacks that can occur in the passage. It has 
several guns, ranging from high caliber guns to machine guns. It also has a 
helicopter landing platform. The main role of the helicopter is to detect and 
classify unknown vessels. Its high speed and maneuverability give the friendly 
forces an advantage against the hostiles. The helicopter can also have a 
machine gun so that it can start firing before the hostile vessels come closer to 
the HVU.  
2. Hostile Boats 
The terrorist boats are loaded with explosives, and their purpose is to get 
closer to a high value unit (HVU) so that they can perform a suicide attack. The 
only target of the hostile boats is the HVU. They do not attack the OPV, but in 
some cases they may try to evade it. One of the critical properties of the terrorist 
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boats is that they are initially acquired as unknown vessels in the friendly force 
radar/systems until they are classified as enemy. Therefore, either the helicopter 
classifies them as enemy, or the unknown vessels get closer to the OPV or HVU, 
and the friendly ships classify them depending on the range. 
3. Neutral Ships 
The known ships and the unknown ships are both neutral, and they do not 
pose a threat to friendly assets. The only difference between the two is that while 
the OPV can instantly classify the known neutral ships with the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) device, unknown ships cannot be classified when 
they are initially detected.  This occurs for several reasons, such as they are too 
small to carry an AIS device or their device is not working. Once the unknown 
vessels are classified, they become known vessels, and their color changes to 
green in MANA. The importance of the known and unknown vessels is to 
represent the real marine traffic of the Strait of Gibraltar as accurately as 
possible. When the neutral ships are close to the hostile boats, the OPV and the 
aircraft are unable to fire to the boats. Moreover, friendly assets need to put in an 
additional effort for classifying the unknown ships as neutral. This makes the 
situation more complicated and gives the terrorists a chance to approach at a 
closer distance without any classification by the friendly force. 
C. SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The scenario is based on a real incident; nevertheless, it is impossible to 
create a model that imitates the real world exactly. Therefore some assumptions 
need to be made, and the limitations of the modeling platforms need to be 
considered in order to build a model that can present useful insights. 
1. Assumptions 
The key assumptions used to build the model are the following: 
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 The OPV has an AIS receiver, which helps to detect and classify 
the neutral ships within some distance. Once they are classified, 
they become neutral ships. 
 Most of the merchant vessels have AIS emitters. They provide their 
data to the friendly forces. However, some ships do not have AIS 
devices even though they are neutral. Those ships need to be 
detected and classified visually or by using radar. 
 The terrorist boats can communicate with each other. 
 The helicopter can classify the unknowns as hostile or neutral once 
it approaches within a certain distance to the target. 
 The terrorists can only perform a kamikaze attack. They do not 
have a long range weapon such as a rocket. 
 The probability of a hit for the weapons is constant within the 




Most of the limitations are related to the combat modeling platforms. For 
instance, it is difficult to implement a naval formation using different squads; 
formation is only allowed for agents within squads. Another limitation is that it is 
difficult to implement tactics in the model. Nevertheless there are ways to 
overcome many such limitations. The personalities of the agents in MANA 
provide exceptional tools for implementing tactics and behaviors (Figure 12). 
Changing the levels for various parameters gives the modeler an opportunity to 
make the agents react to their environment in a smart way. 
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Figure 12.  Personalities of the agents in MANA. 
There are also limitations regarding classified information. For example, 
the probability of hit for a certain weapon is classified information, and it is not 
provided in any open source. Moreover, even if it were provided, there would still 
be some uncertainties about the probability of hit depending on the size of the 
target, weather conditions, etc. To overcome these types of limitations, properties 
of the agents having uncertainties are built as a factor in the DoE. By doing that, 
a wide range of levels for each property is tested. Moreover, this will allow the 
analyst with access to the classified information to pull out the setting of interest 
and come up with a proper result. 
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D. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The only measure of effectiveness in the scenario is the probability of 
mission success. If the HVU can cross the Strait of Gibraltar and reach the goal 
line, it is a mission success. If at least one of the terrorist boats is able to attack 
the HVU, then it is a mission failure.  
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IV. MODEL EXPLORATION 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
Hundreds of factors affect the outcome of a military mission in the real 
world. These factors can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of 
controllable factors that can be manipulated or decided upon in advance or 
during the mission. The second group consists of uncontrollable or noise factors 
that cannot be controlled by any means. For instance, while choosing the speed 
to cross the strait is a controllable factor, the number of enemy forces is an 
uncontrollable factor. 
In total, 35 factors are varied in the simulations, and they are discussed in 
the following section. Among these 35 factors, 29 are controllable factors and 6 
are uncontrollable factors. The NOB Mixed Design spreadsheet is used to 
generate the experimental design in this analysis (Figure 13). This spreadsheet 
allows studying up to 300 factors with 512 design points (Vieira Jr., Sanchez, 
Kienitz, & Belderrain, 2012). 
 
Figure 13.  Partial Screenshot of Nearly Orthogonal Nearly Balanced Mixed 
Design spreadsheet. 
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The NOB Mixed Design spreadsheet ensures that the design has good 
space-filling properties and that the factors are nearly orthogonal. Orthogonality 
has some advantages when fitting a meta-model, because when the factors are 
uncorrelated, both the computation and the interpretation of the response surface 
simplifies (Kleijnen et al., 2005). The maximum correlation between the factors 
studied in this thesis is less than 0.03 which is considered to be very low. A 
scatter plot of a portion of the factors and the mean response is shown in 
Figure 14. The space-filling property can be seen with this graph.  
 
Figure 14.  Scatter plot of part of the variables. Space-filling property of the NOB 
design can be seen with this plot. 
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B. CONTROLLABLE FACTORS 
Controllable factors in the ASUW model consist of the tactics, ROE, and 
physical capabilities of HVU, OPV, and the helicopter. There are three ways for 
the decision maker or naval officer to control these factors: 
 Selecting the capabilities of the systems that form the naval 
combatant prior to the shipbuilding process (e.g., maximum speed, 
presence of the helicopter platform). Factors of this type cannot be 
changed once the ship is commissioned. 
 Changing the properties of the ship following its commissioning 
(e.g., number of machine guns, radar type/range). Factors of this 
type can be changed after the commissioning; however, it is not 
likely since changing these factors needs a significant amount of 
effort, money, and man-hours.  
 Deciding how to use the current capabilities of the ship in a naval 
operation in the most efficient way (e.g., tactics, ROE). 
The ASNET PRONTO NICOP project primarily focuses on the first option, 
which is selecting the capabilities of the surface combatants in advance while 
taking into consideration the operational effectiveness and cost effectiveness. On 
the other hand, the author believes that the tactical/operational decisions or ROE 
may have a paramount effect on the outcome of a mission, and the concept of 
operations can be analyzed along with the capability analysis. Therefore, the 
implications of various tactical/operational decisions and courses of action (COA) 
should be considered in the operational effectiveness studies. For example, the 
maximum speed of a surface combatant is a capability related issue. However, 
even if the speed of the ship is not very fast, the naval officer in charge may be 
able to exploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities to achieve a certain goal with effective 
use of tactics. For this reason, not only capability related factors, but also tactical 
and ROE related factors, are studied in this thesis. 
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1. HVU Factors 
There are no factors that are directly linked to the capabilities of the HVU; 
nevertheless, some factors, such as speed to cross the strait, indirectly affect the 
HVU performance in the mission. These factors are explained in “Tactics and 
Rules of Engagement,” later in this chapter.  
2. OPV Factors 
a. OPV Speed 
In many scenarios previously implemented in MANA, once the 
speed of an agent was set, the agent could only move in that specified speed 
throughout the simulation runs. In this scenario, on the other hand, the OPV’s 
speed is defined in two ways.  
 When there is no enemy, the OPV moves at the speed with 
which the HVU passes through the Strait of Gibraltar. 
Depending on the design point, this speed can be as low as 
10 knots and as high as 20 knots. The speed to cross the 
strait is related to tactics, ROE, and regulations at sea. It is 
explained in “Tactics and Rules of Engagement,” later in this 
chapter. 
 When a friendly asset classifies a boat as hostile, the OPV 
moves towards the hostile boat at its maximum speed, which 
ranges from 20 knots to 40 knots. 
b. OPV Weapons 
The OPV can have three types of weapons in the scenario: a 
large/medium caliber main gun, a small caliber auxiliary gun, and a machine gun. 
Each gun type has a different set of values for the following parameters: hit 
probability, maximum effective range, minimum effective range, and bursts of fire 
per minute. 
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The hit probability for a certain weapon is classified information and 
cannot be obtained from an open source. Moreover, the standard deviation of a 
gun’s probability of hit is relatively high when compared to a missile’s probability 
of hit. The reason for high variation is that the guns are less automated, and 
there are more factors affecting the gun fire. For instance, it is very difficult to hit 
a small speedboat, but it is relatively easy to hit a tanker. Therefore, there cannot 
be a fixed hit probability that fits every situation. For all these reasons, the hit 
probability is varied in the analysis. 
Although it is fairly easy to set most of the weapon properties in 
MANA, it is not straightforward to set the inter-firing time. MANA uses the 




ShotsPerSecond   
In his equation, x is the user input value. For instance, if the user 
sets x to 100, then the agent can fire one shot per second. Unfortunately, MANA 
does not provide a differentiation between a single shot and a burst of fire. While 
a single shot makes more sense for missiles, it does not make much sense when 
the weapon is a gun. Since the weapons used in this scenario are guns, a burst 
of fire is used instead of a single shot in the analysis. The factor used in place of 
“shots per second” is “bursts per minute.” Therefore, the equation below is used 









A burst depends on several factors such as aiming time, distance, 
reloading, target acquisition, and user preference (Abel, 2009). Thus, instead of 
using a fixed value, a range of values is tested in the experiment to see the effect 
of the inter-firing time to the response surface.  
(1) Main Gun (Weapon 1). A warship’s main gun can be 
a large caliber gun or a medium caliber gun. Many navies prefer medium caliber 
guns for their OPVs; therefore, the ranges for the main gun’s general 
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characteristics were chosen based on a medium caliber 76 mm naval  
gun (Table 1). 
 
Factor Min Max Units 
Hit Probability 0.1 0.9 - 
Maximum Effective Range 7000 10000 meters 
Minimum Effective Range 1000 2000 meters 
Bursts per Minute 1 10 bursts 
Table 1.   OPV main gun factors and ranges. 
The main gun’s maximum effective range is substantially 
higher than the auxiliary gun’s and machine gun’s maximum effective ranges. 
Firing from a long range is particularly important in conventional warfare, but not 
necessarily when fighting with terrorists. In areas like the Strait of Gibraltar, there 
are so many merchant vessels that it is almost impossible to classify a ship within 
long distances. In this scenario, the only way to classify an unknown vessel from 
a long distance is with a helicopter. Therefore, even though the maximum 
effective range of the main gun ranges from 7000 meters to 10000 meters, the 
OPV cannot use its main gun if the enemy boat is not classified as hostile. 
To see the effect of the main gun to the response surface, a 
factor that enables or disables the main gun is also added to the experimental 
design. This may help the decision maker to better understand the diverse 
effects of not using a main gun in such missions. 
(2) Auxiliary Gun (Weapon 2). The auxiliary gun for the 
OPV is a small caliber gun. The ranges for the parameters of the auxiliary gun 
are chosen based on a 30 mm naval gun (Table 2). The auxiliary gun’s presence 
is important especially when the OPV is not able use its main gun for some 
reason. If the hit probability of the auxiliary gun is high, it can be a game changer 





Factor Min Max Units 
Hit Probability 0.1 0.9 - 
Maximum Effective Range 1000 3000 meters 
Minimum Effective Range 200 400 meters 
Bursts per Minute 1 10 bursts 
Table 2.   OPV auxiliary gun factors and ranges. 
(3) Machine Guns (Weapons 3, 4, 5). A machine gun is 
operated by OPV personnel, and it has a relatively short effective range when 
compared to the effective ranges of the main and the auxiliary guns. Its main 
purpose is to warn other ships and to protect its own ship from small targets. 
The machine guns are very useful in crowded areas, such as 
straits, since it is extremely hard to classify a small boat from a long distance. It is 
also impossible to use missiles or long range guns at shorter distances. 
Additionally, it might be the case that a country’s ROE may not allow their naval 
vessels to start firing at another vessel unless it approaches within a certain 
distance, such as 500 meters. In this case, the naval vessel can use its machine 
guns both for warning the approaching vessel and for protecting itself.  
A 12.7 mm machine gun is used as a base for the ranges of 
the OPV’s machine guns (Table 3). The minimum effective range for the machine 
guns is fixed at zero.  
 
Factor Min Max Units 
Hit Probability 0.1 0.9 - 
Maximum Effective Range 100 150 meters 
Bursts per Minute 1 10 bursts 
Table 3.   OPV machine gun factors and ranges. 
Another set of factors related to the machine guns is the 
number of machine guns used. In the scenario, the OPV can have at most three 
machine guns. Three factors are dedicated to enabling or disabling each 
machine gun in the experimental design. The guns are all interchangeable, so an 
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alternative design would be use a single factor to set the total number of guns. 
Our approach can be easily extended for future work, if differences in gunner 
capabilities or positioning are explored. 
3. Helicopter Factors 
a. Helicopter Presence 
Whether or not a helicopter is tasked in the escort mission is a 
factor in the experimental design. Although this factor can be related to the 
tactics, it may also be related to the design of the ship. If the ship has a 
helicopter platform, then it can perform helicopter tasks. If not, then the friendly 
assets will need a land-based helicopter tasked to support their mission. 
b. Helicopter Speed and Sensors 
The high speed capability of the helicopter makes it one of the most 
valuable assets of a warship. It can perform search, detection, and 
reconnaissance operations in relatively short amounts of time, with high 
accuracy. Technological advances also allow the helicopters to use cameras that 
help them better classify the targets. The factors of helicopters that are related to 
the speed and the sensors are shown in Table 4. 
 
Factor Min Max Units 
Max Speed 50 180 knots 
Detection Max Range 5000 15000 meters 
Classification Max Range 500 2000 meters 
Table 4.   Helicopter’s maximum speed and sensor factors and ranges. 
Helicopter speed is also defined in two ways.  
 When there is no unknown vessel, the helicopter moves at 
the speed with which the HVU passes through the Strait of 
Gibraltar. 
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 When the helicopter detects an unknown vessel, it moves 
towards that target for classification at its maximum speed, 
which ranges from 50 knots to 180 knots. 
The friendly assets have AIS devices, which allow them to classify 
almost all of the vessels in the strait. However, there are still some vessels that 
cannot be classified via AIS. Once those ships are detected, then the helicopter 
approaches them for classification. In the real world, the classification distance 
may depend on weather conditions, capability of the camera, or the training of 
the operators. Therefore, the classification range is designed to be factor in the 
experiment. This factor ranges from 500 meters to 2000 meters. 
c. Helicopter’s Weapon 
A 12.7 mm machine gun is used as a base for the ranges of the 
helicopter’s machine gun (Table 5). The minimum effective range for the machine 
guns is fixed at zero. 
 
Factor Min Max Units 
Hit Probability 0.1 0.9 - 
Maximum Effective Range 100 150 meters 
Bursts per Minute 1 10 bursts 
Table 5.   Helicopter machine gun factors and ranges. 
Whether the helicopter has a weapon or not is also a factor. In 
almost half of the simulation runs, the helicopter has a machine gun that is 
operated by helicopter crew. In the other half, it does not have any weapons. In 
this case, the helicopter’s only purpose is to detect enemy targets and send this 
information to the OPV and HVU. 
4. Tactics and Rules of Engagement 
From a military point of view, tactics can be defined as the art of using the 
capabilities of the naval forces in a battle, whereas ROE are directives issued by 
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governments that allow or limit naval assets to use their forces (DoD Dictionary, 
2006). Factors related to tactics and ROE are shown in Table 6. 
 
Factor Min Max Units 
Speed to Cross the Strait 10 20 knots 
Range to Start Counter Measures 300 6000 meters 
Distance Between HVU and OPV 500 4000 meters 
Distance Between HVU and Helicopter 3000 10000 meters 
Leading Ship Choice OPV HVU - 
HVU’s Response to Attack Evade Not Evade - 
Table 6.   Factors of tactics and ROE. 
These factors are mostly dependent on the decisions of the officer in 
tactical command (OTC). There is no right choice of parameters that can be used 
in every task; nevertheless, the results of this analysis may yield important 
insights about the tactical decisions in naval escort missions and some areas of 
ASUW. These factors are also important to demonstrate the fact that choice of 
different tactics or different COAs may result in different set of warship 
characteristics. 
a. Speed to Transit the Strait 
In most of the straits and canals all over the world, the coastal 
states adopt laws and regulations to prevent the collision of ships. They usually 
put a maximum and a minimum speed limit within the strait or canal. However, 
depending on the number of ships and the situation, the ships are allowed to use 
higher speeds. 
In the Strait of Gibraltar, the recommended maximum speed limit is 
13 knots (Arceredillo, Sagarminaga, de Stephanis, Cañadas, & Lago, 2008). 
Nevertheless the average speed is higher than 13 knots. If there is intelligence 
regarding a terrorist boat attack in the strait, with which speed should the OTC 
order the convoy to cross the strait? The factor “speed to cross the strait” is 
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ranged from 10 knots to 20 knots to answer this question and to understand 
whether the speed has an effect on the mission success. 
b. Range to Start Counter Measures 
Countries have ROE that allow their warships to start firing on other 
ships when certain conditions are met. The factor “range to start counter 
measures” represents the distance at which the OPV is able to start firing if the 
hostile boat is within the maximum effective range of its weapons. This assumes 
the target ship is classified as hostile and all the necessary warnings are given. 
The range to start counter measures ranges from 300 meters to 6000 meters.  
c. Distance between HVU and OPV 
The distance between the HVU and the OPV is a tactical decision 
and is usually made by the OTC. For instance, when the direction of the enemy 
is unknown, it may be a good idea to keep the distance between the HVU and 
OPV small. On the other hand, if the enemy is expected from a certain direction, 
it may be a better idea to use the OPV in that direction with a greater distance 
between HVU and OPV. However, the direction from which the hostile boats 
approach is not known in this scenario, and this is usually the case in actual 
missions. To understand how the distance between the escort ship and the HVU 
affects mission success, a factor is added to the experimental design. This factor 
ranges from 500 meters to 4000 meters. 
d. Distance between HVU and Helicopter 
The distance between the HVU and the helicopter is also a tactical 
decision; however, it may not be as important as the distance between HVU and 
OPV due to the helicopter’s high speed capability. This factor ranges from 3000 
meters to 10000 meters. 
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e. Leading Ship Choice 
The decision regarding the formation of the ships is a tactical 
decision as well. This decision is particularly important when the convoy does not 
have a helicopter. This factor has two options. The first is keeping the OPV in the 
forward position and making it the leading ship. The second is making the HVU 
the leading ship. 
f. HVU’s Response to Attack 
The HVU has two options when the friendly assets classify a ship 
as hostile. It can either continue on the convoy’s waypoint without changing its 
route, or it can change its route to evade the terrorist boat. 
C. UNCONTROLLABLE FACTORS (NOISE FACTORS) 
1. Hostile Boat Factors 
There are three factors regarding hostile boats: the number of boats, the 
maximum speed of the boats, and whether or not they employ tactics to evade 
the OPV. 
a. Number of Hostile Boats 
The number of terrorist boats is a factor that ranges from one boat 
to ten boats. The location of the boats is selected randomly, and the terrorists are 
assumed to be capable of communicating with each other. Depending on the 
location of each individual boat, the terrorist boats are modeled to perform a 
swarm attack on the HVU. 
b. Hostile Boat Speed 
The speed of the terrorist boats ranges from 20 knots to 40 knots. 
The speed is very important for the terrorist boats when the speed of the OPV is 
lower than their speed, and when the number of bursts per minute for the OPV’s 
weapon is not high. 
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c. Evade OPV 
The terrorists can employ different tactics as well. The scenario 
was modeled such that the terrorist boats do not directly attack the OPV. Their 
only target is the HVU; however, they are aware of the OPV. Therefore, it may be 
a wise choice if they evade the warship, while at the same time approaching the 
HVU. Whether the terrorist boats evade or not is a two-level factor that 
represents the enemy tactics. 
2. Known/Unknown Vessel Factors 
The only factor regarding the known and unknown neutral vessels is their 
number. The initial location of the vessels has a high degree of randomness; 
however, this is not designed to be factor. The ranges of the neutral ships’ 
factors are shown in Table 7. 
 
Factor Min Max 
Number of Known Vessels 10 30 
Number of Unknown Vessels 1 10 
Table 7.   Factors of known/unknown vessels. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Simulation Runs 
The combat model for the operational ASUW scenario was built using 
MANA version 5.01.04. The author started the analysis with 100 replications for 
each of the 512 design points of the DoE. In the meantime, New Zealand’s DTA 
fixed several errors in MANA, which were mostly GUI related errors, and in 
released version 5.01.05. This version was not tested by any NPS faculty or 
students before, and it did not prove to be operating well. Therefore, both for 
testing the new version of MANA and testing the baseline model, another 100 
replications were run using the new version. This time, a different set of columns 
for factors was used in the NOB Mixed Design spreadsheet to increase the 
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space-filling property of the design. Both sets of runs were analyzed, and the 
results showed that the two versions did not differ for this particular scenario. 
Thus, the two concatenated sets of runs, which sum up to 102400 runs with 1024 
design points, are used throughout the data analysis. 
In the initial design, the time step of the model was also a factor. The 
choice of time step is important because it directly affects the total time required 
to make the simulation runs, but overly large time steps can lead to unusual 
behavior and model artifacts (Buss & Al Rowaei, 2010). The values one, two, and 
five were tested in the simulation runs. The results of the runs with time step 
values one and two did not seem to be different, while the results of the runs in 
which the time step is five proved to be slightly different. This indicates that time 
steps of five or larger should be avoided, but there does not appear to be a need 
to reduce the time step even further.  For this reason, and for the fact that it took 
less than 24 hours in a cluster to run 100 replications of this scenario, we 
decided to fix the time step to one. 
2. Regression Analysis 
There are several approaches to regression analysis. While some 
techniques yield similar results, others may result in different meta-models. Two 
techniques are used in this analysis: logistic regression and least squares 
regression. Additionally, partition trees are used to compare the significant 
factors with the significant factors of logistic regression and least squares 
regression meta-models.  
a. Logistic Regression 
The only MOE in this analysis is mission success. Therefore, the 
result of each scenario run is either a success or a failure. This produces a binary 
result, and fitting a logistic regression is a proper way to deal with binary 
response. The distribution of the response in the raw data is shown in Figure 15. 
Among 102400 replications, friendly assets achieved mission success in 74066 
of the runs. The probability of the success in overall replications is around 0.72. 
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Figure 15.  Distribution of the response. 
The summary of the logistic regression model with all the main 
effects is shown in Figure 16. The p-value of this model is less than 0.0001, 
which proves that the saturated logistic regression model is significant when 
compared to the null model. 
 
Figure 16.  Summary of the logistic regression model. 
The leading 15 factors of the logistic regression model sorted in the 
order of significance from high to low are shown in Figure 17. The first five 
factors in the list seem to have a huge impact on the response surface, whereas 
the other factors have much less impact. Moreover, whether or not the OPV main 
gun is enabled appears to be the most significant factor of all. 
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Figure 17.  Parameter estimates for the logistic regression. 
The purpose of this analysis is not predicting the mission success 
of an OPV in an ASUW mission, but rather understanding the factors affecting 
the mission success. Nevertheless, it is still possible to assess how well the 
meta-model predicts the mission success. The Receiver Operator Characteristic 
(ROC) curve is one way to evaluate the meta-models. As a rule of thumb, when 
the area under the ROC curve is between 0.8 and 0.9, the meta-model is 
considered to be predicting well; when it is higher than 0.9, the meta-model is 
considered to be predicting excellently (Hemmingsson, Uddén, & Neovius, 2009). 
The ROC curve of the logistic regression model is demonstrated in Figure 18. 




Figure 18.  The ROC curve for logistic regression model evaluation. 
b. Least Squares Regression 
For any specific design point, even though all the values of the 
input parameters are the same, each simulation run (called a replication) 
produces different results due to the randomness embedded in the modeling 
platform. A designed experiment gives the analyst an opportunity to investigate a 
range of outcomes based on different parameter settings, but it is sometimes 
better to simplify the data to gain more insights. For instance, when dealing with 
a binary response, it is possible to take the mean of the response for all the 
replications at each design point. Then the aggregated average response values 
can be used to predict mission success. Taking the mean of the response for all 
replications of each design point yields a multi-level response ranging from zero 
to one. In this way, the analyst can fit a regular regression model to the 
aggregated data, and this might provide a better insight into the problem at hand 
because it is easy to interpret. 
The distribution of the mean of the response in the aggregated data 
is shown in Figure 19. The overall proportion of mission success is 0.7233, which 
is equal to the proportion of mission success in the raw data. It is also worth 
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noting that there is a large number of instances where the proportion of mission 
success is greater than 0.95 or lower than 0.05. This means it will be more 
difficult for a polynomial model to do an effective job of fitting the aggregated 
response data. Even so, it is interesting to see what factors are most important.   
Stepwise regression methods and expert judgment are used to 
select the significant factors to fit the least squares regression model. The 
threshold for the p-values, or the significance level, which is used as evidence of 
statistical significance for terms included in the models (Htoon & Chan, 2010), is 
set to be very low to avoid over-fitting. This low p-value threshold also reduces 
the chances of “false positives” (Type I errors) when identifying important factors 
and allows us to have interpretable results. It is also true that for large data sets, 
such as those resulting from large-scale simulation experiments, regression 
models can contain terms that are statistically significant but not practically 
important. A low p-value threshold is useful for obtaining relatively parsimonious 
models in these situations. 
 
Figure 19.  Distribution of the mean response. The total number of occurrences 
(N) is 1024. Among those occurrences, 187 of them resulted in with 




(1) Main Effects Model.  The Actual by Predicted plot and 
the Summary of the stepwise model, fitted with only the main factors without any 
interactions, are shown in Figure 20. Only 15 factors, which proved to be 
significant, are included in the model. The R-Square value is around 0.56. This 
value represents how much variability can be explained using this model. There 
is considerable randomness, as is often the case in the combat models, but the 
regression terms can help the analyst focus on what really affects the mission 
success.  
 
Figure 20.  Actual by predicted plot and the summary of the fit for the main effects 
regression model. 
The sorted parameter estimates of the main effects model are 
shown in Figure 21. Note that the first five factors have a more significant effect 
on the probability of mission success when compared to others, as can be seen 
by the magnitudes of the t ratios. These five factors are exactly the same factors 
that showed up in the logistic regression model, as expected. 
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Figure 21.  Sorted parameter estimates of the main effects regression model. 
(2) Second Order Model. The Actual by Predicted plot 
and the Summary of Fit built with the main effects, two-way interactions, and 
polynomials are shown in Figure 22. The R-Squared value of the second order 
model is higher than that of the main effects model, even though the second 
order model contains one less term and involves fewer factors. One might think 
that is why the R-squared value is not very high.  
 
Figure 22.  Sorted parameter estimates for the stepwise regression model to 
include the main effects, two-way interactions, and polynomials. 
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The sorted parameter estimates are shown in Figure 23. The 
six most significant factors are the same as the factors of the main effects model, 
with a slightly different order.  
 
Figure 23.  Sorted parameter estimates of the second order model. 
Some terms of the second order model are polynomials and 
two-way interactions. For example, range to start counter measures is a 
quadratic term. That is, keeping all other factors constant, changing the value of 
this term changes the value of the mission success non-linearly.  
When doing a regression analysis, it is also possible to fit the 
model with more degrees of interactions and polynomials. As a part of this 
regression analysis, three-way interactions were tested as well; however, they 
did not prove to be significant.  
3. Partition Tree  
An important technique for demonstrating the contribution of the factors to 
the response surface is building a partition tree. There are several other names 
given to this type of regression model, including Classification and Regression 
Tree (CART), and decision tree. The partition tree is mainly useful because it is 
easy to understand both for the analyst and the decision maker. It can 
demonstrate interactions, is relatively easy to build, and allows the analyst to 
easily explore the relationship between factors and the response. Furthermore, it 
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can handle both numeric and categorical data (De’ath & Fabricius, 2000). 
Partition trees are often better at fitting jumps or plateaus in the data, and so they 
provide a convenient alternative to polynomial regression models when the 
response is not necessarily smooth.  
A partition tree can be built using either the initial data with binary 
response or the aggregated data with continuous response. Both partition trees 
produce a similar tree structure. The contribution of the factors to the partition 
tree is similar as well. The partition trees used in this analysis were built on the 
raw data, which consists of 102400 data points and binary response. 
When forming the partition tree, it is also possible to choose the set of 
factors on which the splits may occur. A full set of factors will provide insights on 
the relative importance of all the factors, whereas a small set of factors will help 
the analyst to see the effects of specific factors to the response surface. In the 
first part of partition tree analysis, all factors are included in the tree structure. In 
the second part, only the controllable factors are used to build the tree. 
In the following parts of the partition tree analysis, the color blue 
represents the mission success of the friendly assets, and the color red 
represents the mission failure or enemy success. 
a. Partition Tree to Include All Factors 
In this part of the analysis, all the controllable and uncontrollable 
factors are included in the set of factors where the splits can occur. A portion of 
the partition tree for the mission success is shown in Figure 24. The probability of 
mission success or mission failure is demonstrated in the rectangles for each leaf 
of the tree. For example, the first split of the partition tree occurs with the factor 
“range to start counter measures.” When the range to start counter measures is 
greater or equal to 1282 meters, the probability of mission success is 0.7749. 




Figure 24.  Portion of the partition tree to include all the variables. Blue represents 
the probability of mission success and red represents the probability of 
mission failure. 
In this partition tree, the second and third splits occur on whether 
the main gun is available or not, and the probability of hit for the auxiliary gun, 
respectively. If the range to start counter measures is greater than or equal to 
1282 meters, and if the main gun is enabled, then the friendly assets have almost 
a 90% chance of mission success. 
The partition of the data can also be depicted with a partition graph 
as shown in Figure 25. In this graph, each hierarchical level from down to top 
represents the levels of the partition tree. 
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Figure 25.  Partition graph for mission success to include all the factors. Blue 
represents the probability of mission success and red represents the 
probability of mission failure. 
When the OPV starts firing early and uses the main gun, the 
probability of mission success is quite high. But what if the OTC does not want to 
use the main gun, or what if the main gun needs maintenance? In this case, the 
probability of hit for the auxiliary gun comes into play as an important factor. If the 
probability of hit of the auxiliary gun is greater than 0.4, and the OPV is in the 
forward position as a leading ship, then the friendly assets can still achieve high 
probability of mission success. On the other hand, if the hit probability of the 
auxiliary gun is lower than 0.4 and there are four or more hostile boats, the 
probability of success decreases to 0.25. 
The ROE specify how close the hostile boats must be for the ship 
to start counter measures. If this distance is short, then having a helicopter 
becomes more important. The reason for that is the OPV does not leave the HVU 
alone to go ahead and classify the unknown targets. When there is no helicopter, 
the only way for classification is by visually analyzing the target and warning it. If 
the target does not seem to care about the warnings and continues its approach, 
then it is classified as enemy within a certain distance depending on the ROE. 
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When the helicopter is available and it detects an unknown target, it goes above 
the target to classify it. In this case, even when the target is farther away from the 
HVU, it can be classified as hostile or neutral; the friendly assets can start 
counter measures if it is classified as hostile. 
When there are ten splits in the partition tree, the contribution of the 
factors to the mission success is shown in Figure 26. The factors that are 
significant are similar to the significant factors of the regression models as 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
Figure 26.  Factor contributions for partition tree with 10 splits, both controllable 
and uncontrollable factors. 
b. Partition Tree to Include Controllable Factors Only 
In a naval mission, the decision maker has very little or no control 
of the factors related to the enemy or to the merchant traffic. Therefore, what the 
analyst should pay more attention to is the controllable factors. For instance, the 
decision maker may not be able to change the number of hostile boats, but he or 
she can change the number of machine guns on the OPV. The partition tree with 
only the controllable factors included in the model is demonstrated in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27.  Portion of the partition tree to include controllable factors only. Blue 
represents the probability of mission success and red represents the 
probability of mission failure. 
Since most of the significant factors are controllable, the structure 
of the tree does not change significantly. The number of the enemy boats does 
not show up in the tree since it is an uncontrollable factor. The partition graph 
shown in Figure 28 gives a more detailed split of the data. 
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Figure 28.  Partition for mission success to include controllable factors only. Blue 
represents the probability of mission success and red represents the 
probability of mission failure. 
At the top level, the contribution of the OPV’s speed to the mission 
success seems to be important in certain situations. It has been discussed that 
when the OPV starts counter measures from a long distance and cannot use the 
main gun, then the hit probability of the auxiliary gun becomes a significant 
factor. Yet, if the OPV is not the leading ship, there is still high risk in mission 
success when the OPV’s maximum speed is lower than 25 knots. 
An interesting split shown in Figure 28 is the effect of the main 
gun’s hit probability to the mission success. Although having a higher probability 
of hit increases the chance of mission success, it does not improve the outcome 
substantially. More discussion of the hit probabilities appears later in this chapter.  
E. FACTOR SIGNIFICANCE 
The key drivers of the shipbuilding process are the operational 
effectiveness and the cost effectiveness. Decision makers of the naval 
acquisition and shipbuilding processes want to minimize the cost while, at the 
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same time, maximize the operational effectiveness of the naval combatants. On 
the other hand, decision makers at sea, the naval officers, do not primarily care 
about the acquisition cost. Their purpose is accomplishing the mission. Factor 
significance is paramount for both groups for understanding the relative 
importance of factors in the shipbuilding process and in the operational 
environment. 
For the ASUW scenario studied in this thesis, the comparison of the key 
factors (either controllable or uncontrollable) and their rankings in the meta-
models are given in Table 8. The first six factors showed up in all of the 















Main Gun Presence 1 1 1 1 
Number of Hostile Boats 2 2 2 2 
Leading Ship Choice 3 3 3 5 
Range to Start Counter Measures 4 4 5 3 
Auxiliary Gun Hit Probability 5 5 4 4 
Helicopter Presence 6 6 6 6 
OPV Speed 11 11 - 7 
Table 8.   A comparison of the significant factors and their rankings in different 
regression models and partition trees. 
The main gun is the most significant factor affecting the outcome of the 
mission. When the main gun is enabled, the result is generally in the friendly 
force’s favor. On the other hand, if the main gun is not enabled, but the 
probability of hit for the auxiliary gun is high, the friendly assets can still achieve 
favorable results. 
The second most important factor appears to be the number of hostile 
boats. It is obvious that when the number of enemies increases, the friendly force 
is less likely to win. This is an uncontrollable factor; although the decision makers 
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should consider the number of the enemy in their plans, there is almost no way to 
control this in the operational environment. However, there are two alternatives. 
First, it is possible for the analyst to choose a more likely value as an input and to 
perform the analysis using the fixed value. For instance, if the expected number 
of terrorist boats is at most two, the data analysis can be performed taking two as 
constant when scoping the scenario. Second, if a robust alternative is found, that 
means that while the number of enemies has some effect on the overall mission 
success, the decision maker’s plans do not depend on advance knowledge of the 
enemy strength. 
Leading ship choice is another significant factor that showed up in all of 
the regression models. This factor is purely dependent on tactical decisions, and 
the author believes that this is something the decision makers will love to see. An 
important factor that is not directly related to the capabilities of the ship may 
eventually result in substantial reduction of the cost of the naval ships. If a 
warship can achieve the same goal with less capability, why not buy the cheaper 
ship instead of the expensive one? 
Range to start counter measures is mainly related to the ROE, but also 
related to the tactics and the capabilities of the ships. Generally, if the ROE 
permits, starting to fire early increases the chance of mission success. If not, 
then other factors such as hit probability become more important. 
A helicopter is one of the key assets of a warship; however, it is not as 
important in every operational scenario. If the ship is tasked in a search and 
rescue mission, then the helicopter will possibly be the most significant factor. In 
this scenario, on the other hand, it is not one of the top five significant factors. 
OPV maximum speed does not appear to be a key factor in the ASUW 
scenario studied in this thesis. If the maximum speed of the OPV is not very high, 
this can be compensated with tactical decisions such as ordering the ship to be 
the leading ship. 
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F. DISCUSSION AND OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS 
The technological advances in electronics led engineers to build powerful 
warships since the 1900s. Some people began to think that the more capable the 
ship, the greater the chance of mission success. Although this idea might be true 
in some cases, the capability of the ships might not be the key driver of mission 
success in every task.  
There are important practical implications of the data analysis done in this 
thesis. The naval officers should be aware of the fact that tactical decisions may 
be a game changer in favor of the side which uses tactics appropriately. Several 
examples of practical implications and operational insights gained from this study 
are explained in the following paragraphs. 
1. Weapons 
Most of the surface combatants throughout the world have main guns. 
Nevertheless, it might be the case that OPV is not allowed to use the main gun 
due to the ROE, due to malfunction, or because there are merchant vessels 
nearby. In such situation, the OPV needs an auxiliary gun with high probability of 
hit. In many cases, however, increasing the probability of hit of the auxiliary gun 
may not be possible. The best way to overcome this problem appears to be well 
trained personnel. This will ensure that the hit probability of the machine guns will 
turn this disadvantage into an advantage. Thus, the commanding officer (CO) of 
a ship should pay more attention to the training of the machine gun operators, 
especially when deployed in areas with a high number of merchant vessels 
present.  
Although the presence of the main gun appears to be one of the most 
influential factors, its probability of hit did not show up as important. This made 
the author question the model and the analysis. Further investigation of the data 
showed that there are sound reasons to explain why the main gun’s hit 
probability did not show up as significant. A graph of main gun’s hit probability 
versus the probability of mission success is shown in Figure 29. Note that this 
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graph only shows the mission success in the cases where the main gun is 
enabled. The probability of mission success increases slightly with the probability 
of hit up until the probability is equal to 0.5. At first glance, probability of hit higher 
than 0.5 does not seem to make an additional impact on the outcome of the 
mission. One of the reasons might be that it may be more difficult to increase the 
chance of mission success when it approaches 100%. 
 
Figure 29.  Main gun’s hit probability vs. mission success probability. 
A Tukey-Kramer test performed on the data proved that the probability of 
mission success is not statistically different when the hit probability is greater 
than or equal to 0.3 (Figure 30). The practical implication is this: having a main 
gun with probability of hit equal to 0.3 will give similar outcomes when compared 
to a main gun with probability of hit equal to 0.9. This information yields important 
insight: increasing a gun’s probability of hit may not always increase the chance 
of mission success significantly. However, it decreases the variation and, 
therefore, decreases the risk of catastrophic failure. Greater probability of hit 
results in greater robustness. 
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Figure 30.  Connecting letters report for the Tukey-Kramer test. Levels not 
connected by same letter are significantly different. 
Another insight gained from this analysis is that in the ship acquisition 
process, it may not be crucial to buy the “most advanced” technology. The naval 
combatant might be able to accomplish the mission with less capable and 
cheaper systems. 
2. Helicopter 
A challenging problem for the OTC or the CO is to decide when to start 
firing at the hostile targets. If the OPV is not allowed to fire from a long distance 
because of the ROE, or if the CO is willing to wait to be sure about the 
classification of the enemy, then the importance of having a helicopter in the 
mission becomes more obvious. The helicopter ensures that the friendly assets 
classify a ship as hostile from a longer distance. Once it is classified, then there 
is no problem firing at hostile boats at long distances from the HVU. 
3. Range to Start Counter Measures 
In “Data Analysis” it is mentioned that the range to start counter measures 
is a quadratic term of the second order model. What does it mean in terms of 
naval operations? A snapshot of the prediction profiler for this factor is shown in 
Figure 31. Initially, the probability of mission success increases rapidly with the 
range; however, when the range approaches to 3000s, increasing the range 
 61 
does not affect the mission success as much. Furthermore, since the friendly 
force does not have an unlimited number of rounds and since the weapons can 
malfunction with intense use, starting to fire too early may result in a decrease in 
the probability of mission success. 
 
Figure 31.  Prediction profiler for range to start counter measures. 
This shows that analytical tools should be used to enhance our knowledge 
about even obvious tactical decisions and ROE. Moreover, the author believes 
that many of ROE may be tested in the simulation environments, and 
reconsidered in the light of technological advances and experience periodically. 
4. Leading Ship Choice 
The analysis in this thesis showed how a tactical decision might impact 
the outcome of a mission. Leading ship choice is a tactics related factor, and it 
helps the naval officer to better understand the nature of the naval warfare. 
When the convoy is navigating eastward as in this scenario and the OPV 
is the leading ship, one of these three events might happen: 
 The hostile boats may approach from the east as shown in Figure 
32. In this case, the OPV can quickly impede them since it is 
between the HVU and the hostile boats. 
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Figure 32.  Hostile boat approaches from east. 
 The hostile boat may approach from the west as depicted in Figure 
33. In this case, since the relative speed between the convoy and 
the hostile boat is smaller, it takes much more time for the hostile 
boats to reach the convoy. When the OPV changes its course to 
the west and navigates towards the hostile boat, it increases the 
relative speed between the hostile boat and itself, and again quickly 
impedes the hostile boat while the HVU continues on its course. 
 
Figure 33.  Hostile boat approaches from the west. 
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 The hostile boats may approach from north or south. In this case it 
will not  be very important whether the OPV is the leading ship. 
5.  Interaction of the Factors 
Interaction of the terms in a model is also important both for the analyst 
and the decision maker. The interaction plot for the second order model is shown 
in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34.  Interaction plot for the second order model. 
The interaction between range to start counter measures and the 
presence of the helicopter seem to be the most significant. If the range to start 
counter measure is high, the helicopter’s presence has less effect on the mission 
success. If the OPV cannot start firing early, then the helicopter becomes more 
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important. Therefore, in the areas where there is significant maritime traffic, the 
OTC or CO should consider using the helicopter. 
The presence of the main gun appears in interactions with both the 
auxiliary gun’s hit probability and the leading ship choice. When the main gun is 
enabled, the hit probability of the auxiliary gun becomes less important. Similarly, 
when the leading ship is the OPV, whether or not the main gun is enabled has 
less effect on the outcome.  
The main insight gained from interactions is that theydemonstrate a simple 
way to perform trade space analysis between the choices. For instance, if the 
main gun is malfunctioning, the decision maker should consider putting the OPV 
in the front and making the other guns more effective. 
6. Insignificant Factors 
Last, but not least, having a significant factor which appears in each model 
is important; however, it is almost equally important not seeing a factor in the 
significant factors list. That means the decision maker can be more flexible in his 
or her decisions for that specific capability or tactic. 
Moreover, if a factor is not important in the presence of others, this does 
not mean that it is not important by itself. For instance, the probability of hit for 
the main gun did not show up as a significant factor. However, if the auxiliary gun 
is somehow in non-working condition, the hit probability of the main gun becomes 
more important. A trade space analysis is therefore crucial in the early stages of 
the acquisition process.  
G. OTHER IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE COMBAT MODEL 
The scenario built for this thesis was also used in two other ways. First, it 
was used to test the new version of MANA. An experiment on both versions 
showed that the results were not significantly different than the results of the 
previous version of MANA.  
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Following this experiment, more factors were added to the design such 
that the number of factors to be tested was increased from 35 to 65. These 
factors were changed by very small amounts, and so were not expected to have 
important impacts on the mission success. Rather than running a new 512-
design-point experiment, a new Lasso-optimal screening design was replicated 
1000 times, and the resulting data were analyzed. The supersaturated screening 
design used in this method uses only two levels for each factor and can examine 
up to 69 factors with only 24 design points. The results revealed that some of the 
design points cause the simulation to crash. Building the partition tree shown in 
Figure 35 demonstrated that in some cases MANA could not complete the 
simulation for this specific scenario. The problem only occurs when Squad3 (the 
helicopter) is active, and when a specific personality value of this agent is non-
zero. These surprising results show how a well-designed screening experiment 
can be a useful and efficient approach to model verification: it would have been 
much more difficult to identify the software problem using a trial-and-error 
approach. 
 
Figure 35.  Partition tree to show the factor which causes MANA to crash. 
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Finally, the problematic factor was removed from the study and replaced 
with another in order to test the analysis capabilities of a newly proposed Lasso-
optimal analysis method for this screening design (Xing, Wan, Zhu, Sanchez, & 
Kaymal, 2013). The purpose of this effort is to identify significant factors in a 
simulation. Lasso is a popular tool in data mining. It is mainly useful when the 
number of factors is large, and only a small subset of those factors is important. 
Therefore, it has been proposed that Lasso can be used to design and analyze 
screening experiments, even though it is known to give biased estimates. The 
results were mixed for this ASUW scenario: the Lasso model included several 
factors that were not identified in the larger design and omitted several that were. 
Further research is underway to see whether the existence of important 
interactions confuses model identification for Lasso, or whether some of the 




This research investigated the impacts of capability and operational 
related decisions to mission success of surface combatants in an ASUW 
environment. A scenario was built based on a real world incident, and it was 
implemented in the combat modeling platform MANA. 102400 simulations were 
performed in total, and the output of the simulations was analyzed using a variety 
of statistical methods. The results of the analysis yielded important insights for 
the decision makers. Both the tactical decisions and OPV capabilities were 
proved to be important for mission success. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ASUW scenario analyzed in this study provides valuable insights 
regarding the naval shipbuilding process, employing tactics, and ROE. The 
following recommendations are based on the insights gained from the results of 
the analysis: 
 The acquisition of the naval ships needs thorough analysis 
regarding capability, cost, and operational effectiveness. 
 The decision makers of the shipbuilding process, and the decision 
makers at sea (i.e., the naval officers) should work together to set 
the requirements for a ship design. 
 Trade-space analysis is a valuable tool to understand the impact of 
the various factors. 
 Many factors affect the result of a naval mission. Among these, 
there is not “one” set of decisions that provides the mission 
success. There are numerous ways to achieve the same result. 
 Bigger scale modeling and simulations can be performed to 
analyze the operational effectiveness of the naval ships in various 
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tasks. This will help the planning of the CONOPS along with the 
shipbuilding process. 
These recommendations represent the general idea of the implications of 
this research. There are many more insights that can be gained by the reader. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research analyzed only one ASUW scenario that a naval ship may 
face. Building other scenarios for ASUW and for other warfare areas may 
improve the NPS Dashboard. This fine-tuning will help the decision makers better 
understand the trade-space between factors affecting a naval mission. Another 
important study that can be done is building a combat model that incorporates 
several warfare areas such as ASUW, ASW, and AAW at the same time. 
For the researcher who wants to expand the scenario studied in this 
thesis, the following improvements can be added to the combat model in order to 
make a more thorough analysis: 
 Setting aperture angles for the weapons and sensors 
 Increasing the number of OPVs 
 Using several UAVs instead of a helicopter 
 Allowing terrorists to carry weapons such as rockets. 
D. SUMMARY 
In the past, the experience of the sailors was the main driver of the tactical 
decisions. Today, it is the technology and the science that shape tactical decision 
making more intensely. Naval officers should know the characteristics of their 
ships, and they should rely not only their experience but also on analytical tools 
to form their decisions. Choosing the right course of action may reduce the 
emphasis on capability as the primary factor in decision making. This change has 
the potential to reduce the acquisition cost of a naval ship while improving the 
navy’s prospects for achieving mission success. 
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